Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this paper examines the concentration of capital and voting rights in British companies in the second half of the nineteenth century. We find that both capital and voting rights were diffuse by modern-day standards. However, this does not necessarily mean that there was a modern-style separation of ownership from control in Victorian Britain. One major implication of our findings is that diffuse ownership was present in the UK much earlier than previously thought, and given that it occurred in an era with weak shareholder protection law, it somewhat undermines the influential law and finance hypothesis. We also find that diffuse ownership is correlated with large boards, a London head office, non-linear voting rights, and shares traded on multiple markets.
I
One of the biggest questions in the history of the modern public company is: When did ownership separate from control? Influenced by the seminal work of Berle and Means, the standard view amongst economists is that public companies in the U.S. were early movers, with ownership having separated from control at some stage in the early twentieth century, whilst other Anglo-Saxon economies experienced a similar transition in the latter part of the twentieth century.
2 A related question in the history of the modern public company is: What organisational structures and corporate governance systems were used to finance industrialisation? 3 In particular, to what extent did the legal system and investor protection laws facilitate the raising of capital to finance industrialisation? In this paper, we address these big questions in the history of the modern company by analysing corporate ownership and control in Britain in the five decades after the liberalisation of incorporation law in 1856.
At least two things make Britain at this time an ideal place to address these big questions: (a) it was the world's largest capital market and (b) there was a rapid expansion of the equity market and democratisation of share ownership. 4 Using 890 detailed corporate ownership records, we address three particular questions in this paper. The first is when did diffuse ownership emerge in Britain? Until recently, the consensus in the extant literature was that dispersed ownership appeared in Britain at some stage in the second half of the twentieth century. 5 Foreman-Peck and Hannah, however, have shown that ownership was divorced from control for the largest British companies in 1911. 6 Our study goes further by showing that dispersed ownership is commonplace at least half a century earlier than 1911 and that ownership is dispersed in medium-sized and small companies, and not just in the largest. However, we also find that companies established in the 1890s had more concentrated ownership than companies established in earlier periods.
This finding is consistent with Cheffins et al. and Franks et al. who find that companies established around 1900 tended to have concentrated ownership.
7
Although we find diffuse ownership and an absence of blockholders in our sample, this does not in and of itself mean that we have a modern-day separation of ownership from control in Victorian Britain. The companies in our sample differ from modern companies in that they had significantly lower numbers of shareholders, there were no arms-length institutional investors, and many of the earlier companies in our sample were not conversions of previously established businesses; rather they were new ventures which raised capital from the stock market at their inception. shareholders effectively maintained control of the company. However, we have no evidence which either supports or refutes this possibility.
Given that ownership was relatively diffuse, we then address the following question:
was legal protection of investors a precondition for the emergence of the diffusely-owned corporation in Britain? The influential law and finance school argue that strong legal protection of minority shareholders is a precondition of dispersed ownership. 9 As Britain had a laissez-faire company law regime from the perspective of most minority shareholders in non-statutory companies in the nineteenth century, our finding that corporate ownership is dispersed is evidence against the law and finance hypothesis. 10 Our findings in this regard concur with recent studies on the history of corporate ownership in other economies.
11
The third question which we address in the paper is: What were the correlates or potential determinants of ownership structure in Victorian Britain? To examine this issue, we use firm-specific data to run a horse race between various hypotheses which have been suggested in the literature. In the corporate finance literature, firm size, and operating environment have been identified as potential determinants of ownership structure. 12 Hilt and Musacchio suggest that voting rights which empower small shareholders and limit the power of large shareholders are associated with greater ownership diffusion. 13 In terms of Britain, it 12 Demsetz and Lehn, 'Structure of corporate ownership'. See also Richter and Weiss, 'Determinants'. 13 Hilt, 'When did ownership separate from control'; Musacchio, Experiments, has been suggested that an official listing contributed to the diffusion of ownership, 14 as have trust and proximity of investors to company headquarters. 15 In addition to these hypotheses, we also test whether having a London headquarters, the number of markets on which a company was listed, the denomination of a company's stock, and board size are correlates of ownership structure. We find no evidence of a relationship between ownership structure and size or the nature of a company's assets and operating environment. We also find that an official listing and our proxies for trust are not correlated with ownership concentration.
However, our results suggest that voting rights, board structure, having a London headquarters, and the number of stock markets a company is traded on are related to ownership structure.
This study is significant for at least a further two reasons. First, several business and economic historians have suggested that Britain's twentieth-century economic decline and managerial failure has some of its roots in the concentrated structure of corporate ownership which emerged out of the nineteenth century. 16 Second, if corporate ownership is path dependant, as some scholars believe, it is important that we know the structure of ownership in the UK at the origin of the modern public company.
17
The next section of this paper examines the preconditions for the rise of diffuse ownership and the separation of ownership from control. Section three describes the gradual liberalisation of incorporation law in the UK and examines the ownership structure of several pre-1856 companies for which ownership data exists. Section four describes our ownership and control data sources. Section five presents our main findings on the structure of ownership in Victorian Britain. Section six examines how ownership structure varies across industry, our sample period, and voting rights. Section seven analyses the correlates of ownership structure.
II
Prior to the liberalisation of incorporation law in the nineteenth century, corporate status was only available as a privilege extended by Parliament or the Crown e.g., canal companies and railways. Consequently, most other businesses constituted as common-law partnerships. interfere, implying that individual shareholders could not proceed with an action against the company directors. In other words, this ruling precluded individual shareholders from launching a suit on the company's behalf. This important precedent strengthened the rights of directors and company insiders at the expense of minority shareholders.
As our sample companies were registered under the 1862 Companies Act and as the vast majority of our observations are from before the above-mentioned strengthening of shareholder protection legislation at the turn of the twentieth century, we are able to look at the dispersion of ownership in an environment with very weak (by modern-day standards)
shareholder protection. It is a well-established fact that shareholder protection under the Table 1 suggest that the ownership of these five banks, two insurance companies, and one major railway was diffuse in that the proportion capital owned by the largest shareholder and top five shareholders was relatively low.
<INSERT The ownership returns were usually completed by hand on Form E, a standardised return form, which gave a summary of capital and shares i.e., names and holdings of shareholders for both ordinary and preference shares. We photographed 999 returns of Form E, which were then inputted manually and verified by data-entry services. In total, after removing firm-years which have missing and unintelligible data, we have ownership returns for 890 firm-years, representing 488 unique firms.
As we are interested in control as well as cash-flow rights, we collected data on each company's voting scales for each year for which they are in our sample from their articles of association, Burdett's Official Intelligence (BOI) and Stock Exchange Official Intelligence (SEOI). These were then used to calculate each shareholder's voting rights. In total, we found the voting structures of 729 of the 890 firm-years of ownership returns.
As the ownership returns do not report the membership of the board of directors, we obtained the names of directors for the relevant years from articles of association, BOI, SEOI,
and Stock Exchange Year-book (SEY). In total, we located director names for 575 out of the 890 firm-years in our sample. Each set of ownership returns was then manually scrutinized to ascertain the share ownership of each director.
We also collected data on firm age, total paid-up capital, location of head office, share qualifications for directors, and nominal and par values of shares from articles of association, BOI, and SEOI. The stock markets where shares were traded were obtained from BOI and SEOI for 1883 onwards, with the Investor's Monthly Manual (IMM) being used for the 1864-82 period.
As the source of our ownership data is the files of companies which were dissolved before the 1970s, we may be introducing a bias into our sample in that the ownership structure of such companies may be different from companies which were not dissolved before the 1970s, particularly if dissolution occurred for performance reasons. Admittedly, very few companies established in the nineteenth century were still operating as independent entities by the 1970s. Nevertheless, we checked all our sample companies against the Register of Defunct Companies, which lists any company which delisted from the stock exchange from 1875 onwards as well as the reason for delisting. 43 The vast majority of sample companies were not dissolved for explicit performance reasons -55.5 per cent reconstructed their capital or merged with another firm. Only 27.7 per cent of our sample companies delisted for explicit performance reasons i.e., they were wound-up voluntarily or by court order.
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE>
From Table 2 we observe the following about our sample. First, there is a good spread of companies across time, with slightly more observations in the 1880s and 1890s, which is unsurprising given the expansion of the stock market in these decades. 44 Second, average company size changes little over the sample period, albeit that it is slightly lower in 43 As a small number of companies were not covered by the Register of Defunct Companies, we used the London and Edinburgh Gazettes for these companies. 44 Grossman, 'New indices'. the 1860s and slightly higher in the 1900s. Third, the average number of shareholders rises steadily over the sample period, which, taken with the fact that the average par value of firms changes little, suggests that ownership may have become more diffused over time. Fourth, the relative size of the companies in our sample compared to all non-railway companies traded on the stock market indicates that very few companies in our sample are in the top two deciles of companies by par value in any particular year.
From Table 3 , we see that there is a good spread of companies from different industries. The commercial and industrial sector is the largest in the sample, which is unsurprising as this was a growth sector in the stock market between 1860 and 1900.
45
V Table 3 contains our first major finding. We see from the bottom row of Table 4 compares ownership concentration in the UK for the Victorian era with that for later periods. Comparability across various ownership studies is not straightforward as some report cash flow rights but not voting rights and vice versa. More fundamentally, however, studies which look at the twentieth century focus on the largest companies. To the extent that comparisons can be made, we see that the mean capital held by the largest investor was slightly higher in the twentieth century, which indicates that corporate ownership became a bit more concentrated during the twentieth century. In terms of capital, directors in the first half of the twentieth century tended to own a smaller proportion of a company's capital than they did in the nineteenth century. However, the companies in the first half of the twentieth century were larger and their voting was more concentrated than their capital because they were issued non-voting preference shares. 49 Notably, the figures for director ownership for 1990 and 1995, which contain industrial companies of various sizes, are comparable to the Victorian era. Although ownership in our sample is more diffuse than the top 350 companies in 2013 in terms of the capital held by the largest and twenty largest investors, directors owned greater amounts of capital in the Victorian era than they did in 2013.
<INSERT The results presented in this section illustrate that Victorian companies had dispersed ownership by modern standards. However, there are important caveats to this conclusion. The identity of large shareholders has changed over time with passive financial institutions and asset managers being more prevalent now. In addition, if the largest twenty shareholders in a particular firm had been willing and able to form a coalition, they would generally have controlled a substantial interest in that firm.
VI
As can be seen from Table 3 , the low concentration of ownership and voting in Victorian
Britain is not being driven by one or two industries. All industries in Table 3 can be described more or less as having diffuse ownership. The most diffuse sector in terms of capital concentration is banking and in terms of voting concentration, banking is joined by insurance and finance companies as the least concentrated.
Banking, finance, and insurance companies typically structured their articles of association to ensure that they had diffuse ownership by restricting the amount of shares any one investor could own and / or by skewing their voting scales in favour of small investors.
53
One reason for doing so was that such companies usually had uncalled capital or extended liability, and depositors and policy-holders with these companies may have preferred to see the company's shares dispersed amongst many owners because there was less risk of many owners becoming bankrupt as compared to a few owners. 53 Acheson et al., 'Does limited liability matter?'
As can be seen from Table 3 , breweries are at the other end of the ownership concentration spectrum. From 1870 onwards, breweries converted to public limited companies because of increased capital needs arising from technological changes which increased the optimal size of breweries and the need for breweries to secure public houses following regulatory changes in the licensing of public houses. 54 Unlike many other sectors in Table 3 , the breweries were well-established businesses before they came to market and their original owners had a desire to maintain as much control as possible once their firms went public.
55 Table 7 enables us to see whether capital and voting concentration change over time and as companies mature. The first thing to note from Table 7 is that capital and voting concentration decline over time. This suggests that capital and voting rights become more diffuse as companies mature, indicating that the secondary trading of shares may have led to reduced ownership concentration.
<INSERT TABLE 7 HERE>
The second point of note from Table 7 is that as the nineteenth century progresses, the initial concentration of ownership and voting rights increases so that by the 1890s, the five largest investors on average have 43.8 per cent of capital and 42.9 per cent of voting rights, whereas in the 1860s the equivalent figures were 33.0 and 22.8 respectively. The third thing to note is that voting rights are slightly less concentrated than capital over most of the sample period. However, companies established in the 1890s appear to have more concentrated voting rights than capital by the 1900s.
The question arises as to why ownership is much more concentrated for companies establishing in the final decade of our sample period. One possibility is that the companies 54 Cottrell, Industrial finance, p. 168.
establishing in the 1890s are smaller. However, the opposite is the case. Another possibility is that the cohort is dominated by one industry. No one industry dominates, but even if we remove the industry with the highest concentration (breweries), ownership is still much more concentrated for companies establishing in the 1890s. In the SEOI and BOI, the companies in our sample incorporated in the 1890s were mainly described as being "registered" whereas in previous decades in our sample, the vast majority of companies are described as "established". In other words, what is different about the companies going public in the 1890s is that they are conversions to public company status of established firms which were previously constituted as partnerships. Given this trend in the 1890s, it is perhaps unsurprising that Chandler viewed many British industrial companies at the turn of the twentieth century as being family-controlled enterprises which were "personally managed".
56
As can be seen from Table 8 , which shows how voting rights evolved over time, early in the sample period most companies had voting scales which penalised large investors, with the result that voting rights were more dispersed than capital. In other words, many companies had voting scales which placed a cap on the maximum number of votes which any one investor could have and / or had a graduated voting scale skewed against large owners (e.g., 5-10 shares = 1 vote; 10-25 = 2 votes; 25-50 shares = 3 votes; 50-100 shares = 4 votes; 100-200 shares = 5 votes; and one vote for every additional 200 hundred shares). As can be seen from Table 8 , these types of scale became less common amongst companies established in the 1870s and 1880s, and by the 1890s only 19.1 per cent of companies in our sample operated such voting scales. In other words, the majority of companies established in the second half of our sample period operated linear voting schemes i.e., one-share-one-vote schemes or x-shares-one-vote schemes.
<INSERT The existence of non-voting preference shares concentrates voting rights to ordinary shareholders, making voting rights relatively more concentrated than capital. 57 As can be seen from Table 8 , preference shares were not used much by companies established in the 1850s, 1860s, or 1870s, but they were increasingly popular amongst companies established in the 1880s, and were particularly popular with companies established in the 1890s. The popularity of preference shares amongst these companies explains why voting rights were more concentrated than capital for companies established in the latter part of our sample period. supply-side reason as to why preference shares were issued. Many of the companies which went public from about the 1890s onwards were conversions of long-established partnerships or private companies and the original owners, whilst wanting to raise capital from the public, wished to maintain effective control of their companies. The best way to achieve this end was to issue non-voting preference shares. On the demand side, the rise of preference shares was driven by the rise of middle-class investors interested in a regular fixed income, but not in the governance of a particular company. 58 57 Some preference shares at this time had voting rights attached to them, but we only have eight firm-years in our sample where there were preference shares which had voting rights. 58 Jefferys, Business organisation, p.216.
<INSERT TABLE 9 HERE> VII
In general, ownership structure was diffuse in Victorian Britain, but there was a wide variation in ownership structure across sample firms, which raises the question as to the correlates and ultimately the potential determinants of ownership structure. In this section, we explore econometrically the correlates of ownership structure in our sample.
Size is usually regarded as an important determinant of ownership structure. 59 Large firms have a need for larger capital resources, implying that the value of a given fraction of ownership will be higher, reducing capital concentration. We use company par value as proxy for size.
According to Demsetz and Lehn, companies located in an industry where it is difficult to assess and monitor managerial performance should have more concentrated ownership.
60
Given the asymmetric information problems endemic in financial institutions, one might expect more concentrated ownership in this industry. In addition, the information asymmetries between managers and shareholders would be large in the mining industry given that many mines were located overseas or far away from stock markets. On the other hand, utilities, which were usually local monopolies characterised by stable prices, technology and market share, should have more diffuse ownership. We use industry dummies to test these conjectures.
As Hilt and Musacchio have suggested that voting rights potentially determine ownership structure, we use two binary variables to capture whether voting rights which discriminate against or empower large shareholders are correlated with ownership 59 Demsetz and Lehn, 'Structure of corporate ownership'.
concentration. 61 The first binary variable takes account of whether a firm has issued nonvoting preference shares, whilst the second takes account of whether a company has a nonlinear voting structure.
Hannah has hypothesised that having a prestigious official listing contributed to the diffusion of ownership because of the two-thirds rule. 62 We test this hypothesis by creating a binary variable which takes the value one if a company was on the official list of the stock exchange, zero otherwise. As some scholars have claimed that trust and the proximity of investors to company headquarters resulted in ownership diffusion occurring in Britain, we also create a variable which attempts to capture the proximity of shareholders as a body to the company headquarters. 63 As Britain had multiple regional stock exchanges in the Victorian era, we exploit this fact to create a variable which measures the distance between a company's headquarters and the main stock exchange where its shares were traded.
We also test a few additional hypotheses. As some companies in Victorian Britain had their shares traded on more than one stock market, we expect that the greater the number of stock exchanges a company was traded on, the less concentrated was its ownership. We also expect companies with a head office in London to have more diffuse ownership, since they potentially have access to a larger capital market and number of investors.
Campbell and Turner and Foreman-Peck and Hannah find that larger boards in the
Victorian and Edwardian periods are associated with better performing companies, which could be interpreted as larger boards alleviating the agency problems that are associated with diffuse ownership, since the greater the number of directors, the greater the cost of collusion with executive directors and the greater the degree of mutual monitoring conducted by 61 Hilt, 'When did ownership separate from control'; Musacchio, Experiments, p. 110-5. 62 Hannah, 'Divorce of ownership'.
63 Franks et al., 'Ownership'. directors. 64 In addition, the existence of directorial share qualifications in most companies meant that the greater the number of directors, the greater the incentives of directors to monitor company executives. 65 We therefore explore the correlation between board size and ownership structure.
Uncalled capital, whereby a proportion of a company's capital remained unpaid, was a common feature of stocks in this era. 66 The presence of uncalled capital could potentially result in more diffuse ownership as investors are reluctant to take large stakes because of the liability which is attached to share ownership or it could result in concentrated ownership as it lowers the costs of monitoring co-owners to ensure that they have adequate wealth to pay potential calls. 67 We therefore test whether the amount of uncalled capital was correlated with ownership concentration.
As companies had a wide range of share denominations in this era (see Appendix Table 10 and these results are robust to the use of panel specifications with random effects. In our regression analysis, we only show correlations between variables and our results do not imply causality.
<INSERT TABLE 10>
As can be seen from Table 10 , there is little statistical or economic relationship between ownership structure and firm size. Notably, Hilt and Musacchio also find that size and ownership structure are unrelated. 68 One explanation for this finding is that as one of the main benefits of incorporating is that ownership can be separated from control, one should not expect firm size to be an important determinant of ownership structure. Another explanation is that the amount of capital or votes controlled by insiders was almost immaterial from the point of view of actual control of the company. Yet another possibility is that many of the early firms in our sample were set up with no blockholders, unlike modernday firms and unlike firms towards the end of our sample period. Therefore, whether big or small, companies had dispersed ownership.
The industry binary variables in Table 10 reveal that industries in Victorian Britain,
where it was more difficult to assess and monitor managerial performance (e.g., mining and financial companies), do not have more diffuse ownership than companies where it is easier to assess managerial performance (e.g., utilities). This goes against Demsetz and Lehn's view. Indeed, financial institutions have much more diffuse ownership than other sectors.
One possibility could be that the financial sector was regulated or monitored by the government, thus ensuring trust in this sector. 69 However, this sector faced no regulation until well into the twentieth century. A more likely possibly is that this result arises from the fact that some banks and insurance companies limited the amount of shares that any one individual could own.
The two variables which attempt to capture the voting structures of companies (NonVotePreference and VotingNonLinear) reveal that neither has an effect on capital concentration (specifications 1 to 3), but that the presence of voting schemes which discriminate against large investors results in less concentrated voting rights (specifications 4 to 6), which is consistent with the findings reported in the previous section and those of Hilt and Musacchio.
The regression results also suggest that there is no correlation between being on the Official List and ownership concentration, which raises a question about the role played by official listing requirements in separating ownership from control.
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Four of the six coefficients in specifications 1 to 6 on the LocalMiles variable are statistically significant, and each of these coefficients is positive but very small in an economic sense. This finding suggests that the proximity of investors to a company is not closely related with ownership structure, which is inconsistent with the notion that trust may be higher amongst investors living in proximity to companies and their directors.
As can be seen from the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the NumMarkets variable, the greater the number of markets a company's shares were traded on, the less concentrated was its capital and voting, which is consistent with our expectation.
The results in Table 10 also reveal that companies with a head office in London tended to have less capital and voting concentrated in the hands of insiders and less capital and voting 70 When a random effects specification is used, the coefficients on this variable in the three regressions where voting rights is the dependent variable are statistically significant and positive, which implies that an official listing is correlated with more concentrated ownership.
concentrated in the hands of the top five shareholders, which again is consistent with our priors.
Unsurprisingly, specifications 1 and 4 in Table 10 reveal that the greater the number of directors, the more concentrated is the percentage of capital and votes controlled by insiders (i.e., directors and large shareholders). However, the results in specifications 2, 3, 5
and 6 of Table 10 reveal that the greater the number of board members, the lower is the concentration of capital and voting as measured by the percentage held by the largest five investors and the Herfindahl index, which is consistent with our prior expectations.
As can be seen from Table 10 , the presence of uncalled capital is uncorrelated with ownership structure. In addition, the coefficient on the ParValue variable suggests that the denomination of shares is not correlated with ownership concentration. 71 In other words, neither the character nor denomination of shares mattered for ownership concentration.
There are positive and statistically significant coefficients on the DirQualScale variable. As the average director qualification in our regression analysis was 0.4 per cent of paid-up capital (Appendix Table 2 ), this result is largely an artefact of the qualifications.
However, this is not to suggest that the presence of qualifications inspired trust in the company by aligning incentives of directors with shareholders.
As there is a suggestion in the literature that company promoters designed company bylaws not necessarily to have dispersed ownership, but simply to have a large number of shareholders, we examine the effect of our various independent variables on the log of the number of shareholders (see specification 7 of Table 10 ). 72 Notably, voting regimes which discriminated against large shareholders and the presence of preference shares had no bearing 71 For the sake of robustness, we also use par value as a percentage of average annual income, but it makes no difference to this finding. 72 Hilt, 'When did ownership separate from control'.
on the number of shareholders. Most other independent variables have the expected sign, but surprisingly an official listing is correlated with a lower number of shareholders.
The statistically significant positive coefficients on the EstablishmentDate variable in In summary, the main findings from our regressions are that the diffusion of ownership was correlated with having a head office in London as well as the listing of shares on numerous regional stock exchanges. In addition, board size also seems to have played a role in facilitating the diffusion of ownership. Non-linear voting rights, which penalised large investors, were also associated with lower levels of voting concentration.
VIII
The main findings of this paper are fourfold. First, relative to modern-day standards for large publicly-traded companies, never mind medium-sized and small companies, Victorian Britain had dispersed ownership, with ownership being separated from control. If one believes that separating ownership from control is one of the definitive features of the corporation, this finding is, in one sense, not that surprising. However, for reasons outlined above, one needs to be circumspect in ascribing a modern-style separation of ownership and control to public companies in Victorian Britain.
Second, given the limited shareholder protection afforded by the 1862 Companies Act, the dispersed nature of ownership in this period is evidence against the law and finance hypothesis, which argues that strong investor protection law is a prerequisite for dispersed ownership. This raises a question as to why dispersed ownership was commonplace. A combination of factors may have played a role. Capital market discipline, investors demand for nearly all earnings to be paid out as dividends, and local stock exchanges may have also played a role in the rise of dispersed ownership.
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Another possibility is that diffuse ownership was possible as ownership did not fully separate from control, because coalitions of shareholders controlled companies. This possibility needs to be explored in future work.
Third, we find that ownership structure was correlated with several factors. A diffuse ownership structure was more likely to be found in companies which had larger boards, a head office in London, non-linear voting scales, and shares traded on more than one stock market.
Fourth, although concentration of ownership tended to erode within each cohort over time, companies formed in the 1890s had greater capital and voting concentration than those formed in earlier decades, and, unlike companies formed in earlier decades, the insiders in these companies were able to maintain their voting rights. Future research should focus on why this turn happened and the long-run effect of it on the UK's corporate economy. 73 Campbell and Turner, 'Substitutes' Notes: As the many railways traded on British stock markets were large, their inclusion in this table would mean that there would be fewer of our sample companies in the top two deciles or the top half of the size distribution of public companies. Two shareholder returns for 1853 are included in our sample as these had been preserved in the archives. These were companies formed under the 1844 Companies Act which subsequently registered under the 1862 Companies Act. The relative size of companies compared to non-railway companies is the average of the yearly figures. Company size is measured in terms of the par value of its equity. There are 18 of the 890 firm years for which we do not have accurate data on their par value. Source: see text.
Notes: The first row is usually a basic one-vote-per-share or x-votes-per-share arrangement with no preference shares. The small difference between capital and voting concentration is that for some companies it may have been one vote for five shares, so anyone holding four shares did not get a vote, those holding nine shares only got one vote etc.. Insiders are defined as directors, or owners with more than 10 per cent of capital. The Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared proportion of capital owned by each investor in a company. The sample in this table is restricted to companies where both capital and voting data available. Notes: All the dependent variables are in log form so as to make them closer to being normally distributed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm-years where there were director qualifications but where less than 80% of directors held shares have been removed from columns (1) and (4). In addition, we removed one outlier, which had a par value of £1,000. If data on certain variables that were unlikely to change over time (i.e., establishment date, head office, number of markets where shares were traded, and director qualifications) were missing for a particular time period, but were available for that company for another time, we assumed the value remained the same. We ran robustness checks without this assumption, which reduced the number of observations, but our regression results remained the same. 
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